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Abstract
We consider the problem of updating of an agent’s knowledge. We propose a formal method of
knowledge update on the basis of the semantics of modal logic S5. In our method, an update is spec-
ified according to the minimal change on both the agent’s actual world and knowledge. We discuss
general minimal change properties of knowledge update and show that our knowledge update oper-
ator satisfies all the update postulates of Katsuno and Mendelzon. We characterize several specific
forms of knowledge update which have important applications in reasoning about change of agents’
knowledge. We also examine the persistence property of knowledge and ignorance associated with
knowledge update.
We then investigate the computational complexity of model checking for knowledge update. We
first show that in general the model checking for knowledge update is P2 -complete. We then identify
a subclass of knowledge update problems that has polynomial time complexity for model checking.
We point out that some important knowledge update problems belong to this subclass. We further ad-
dress another interesting subclass of knowledge update problems for which the complexity of model
checking is NP-complete.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
The well-studied issues of belief update and belief revision [16] are concerned with the
update and revision aspects of an agent’s belief with respect to new beliefs. The notion
of belief update has been used, and often serves as a guideline [15,30,36], in reasoning
about the effect of (world altering) actions on the state of the world. Thus if φ represents
the agent’s belief about the world and the agent performs an action that is supposed to
make ψ true in the resulting world, then the agent’s belief about the resulting world can be
described by φ  ψ , where  is the update operator of choice.
Now let us consider reasoning about sensing actions [26,28], which in their pure form,
when executed, do not change the world, but change the agent’s knowledge about the
world. Let sensef be a sensing action whose effect is that after it is executed the agent
knows whether f is true or not. This can be expressed as Kf ∨ K¬f , where K is the
modal operator Knows. The current theory of belief updates does not tell us how to do
updates with respect to such gain in knowledge due to a sensing action. In this regard note
that we can not just have f ∨ ¬f and use the notion of belief update, as f ∨ ¬f is a
tautology.
A theory of knowledge update as targeted here will allow a reasoner to verify the cor-
rectness of a plan with both physical and sensing actions. The reasoner, different from the
agent who will be executing the plan including sensing as prescribed by the plan, will be
able to verify if the updating of a formula representing the initial state of the world (both
physically and in terms of what the agent knows about it) by the effect of the actions in the
plan will lead to a desired state of the world.
In the recent past there has also been some research in dynamic epistemic logics, e.g. [3,
4,9–12,24,29,34,35] where the changes in information states (of agents) is the main focus
but changes in the real world are usually not modeled.
The main goal of this paper is to define a notion of knowledge update, analogous to
belief update, where the original theory (say α) and the new theory (say β) are in a language
that can express knowledge, and changes are allowed in both the real world and the agent’s
knowledge about the world. Such a notion would not only serve as a guideline to reason
about pure and mixed sensing actions in the presence of constraints, but also allow us to
reason about actions corresponding to forgetting and ignorance.
In this paper we investigate the model theoretic semantics and the associated reasoning
and complexity properties of such knowledge update. This not only provides the theoretical
foundation to enhance the current robotic planning paradigm, as has been observed by other
researchers, e.g. [20,26–28], but can also be viewed as another approach for modeling
knowledge dynamics.
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Since most of the research in dynamic epistemic logics has been reported outside Arti-
ficial Intelligence avenues, in this subsection we give a brief overview of that direction of
research and how it compares to our goals.
While research on reasoning about knowledge has made significant progress in the last
decade, e.g. [6,13,17,21,25], the problem of modeling the dynamics of knowledge has only
received attention in recent years from different perspectives. One of the major motivations
of studying knowledge dynamics is for the purpose of modeling the dynamics of distributed
systems. In this regard Fagin et al. [6] studied the relationship between knowledge and time
from an axiomatization viewpoint where change in knowledge is caused by executing the
distributed system’s actions. Following this work, van der Meyden [33] also studied the
computational aspect of knowledge modeling in distributed environments where the issue
of knowledge update was discussed. Although van der Meyden showed that his knowledge
update presented a generalization of certain aspects of standard knowledge base update,
he only used it for the purpose of efficiently implementing model checking and did not
explore knowledge update from a more semantical perspective.
Fagin et al.’s work on knowledge has recently motivated a stream of interesting investi-
gations on dynamic epistemic logics, e.g. [3,4,9–12,24,29,34,35]. Changes in information
states (of agents), represented by a collection of possible worlds, have been widely studied
in these logics. Most of these works differ from our approach in that they usually do not
model changes in the real world. The following quote from p. 4 of [10] gives a feel of
research in these studies:
In this section we will define operations on possibilities that correspond to changes in
the information states of the agents. The kind of information change we want to model
is that of agents getting new information and learning that the information state of some
other agent has changed in a certain way. I will introduce ‘programs’ in the object
language that describe such changes. Changes in the ‘real world’ will not be modeled,
and I will ignore other operations of information change such as belief contraction or
‘belief revision’.
From our discussions above, we can see that knowledge dynamic modeling has been
studied by many researchers in recent years. This paper can be viewed as a further study on
knowledge dynamics but from a different perspective. Our focus is on the model theoretic
semantics of knowledge update. This has direct applications in the field of reasoning about
agents’ knowledge related actions, particularly in the construction and verification of plans
with sensing actions. We also explore the computational properties of various knowledge
update forms so as to provide guidelines for future implementations.
Most of the previous work on knowledge dynamics and dynamic epistemic logics focus
on the development of formal axiomatic systems that are able to deal with the dynamics of
epistemic states and actions. Although these logics have significant applications in various
multi agent environments, they seem not quite applicable for our purpose mentioned earlier.
Also, the computational properties of these logics remain unexplored.
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The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
(1) We define a model theoretic semantics for knowledge update based on the single agent
S5 modal logic. This knowledge update semantics presents a generalization of tradi-
tional model based belief update by allowing for modalities in the base language. That
is, in our framework changes on both the actual world and the knowledge state of the
agent are allowable. Our underlying knowledge update operator can be characterized
by an explicit minimal change principle and satisfies Katsuno and Mendelzon’s clas-
sical belief update postulates [16].
(2) We characterize various forms of knowledge update such as gaining knowledge up-
date, ignorance update, sensing update and forgetting update. Each of these update
forms has its specific meaning in reasoning about agent’s knowledge related actions.
Furthermore, we also investigate the persistence of knowledge and ignorance during a
knowledge update. Our results provide restricted monotonicity properties that may be
used to simplify the underlying inference problem in knowledge update.
(3) We investigate the computational complexity of model checking for knowledge up-
date. We show that in general the model checking problem for knowledge update is
P2 -complete, which places the problem in the same layer of the polynomial hierar-
chy as the traditional model based belief update (e.g. PMA) [19]. We then identify a
subclass of knowledge update problems for which model checking can be achieved
in polynomial time. We observe that some important knowledge update problems be-
long to this subclass. We further address another interesting middle class of knowledge
update problem for which the complexity for model checking is NP-complete.
1.4. Structure of the reminder of the paper
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we start with describ-
ing the particular modal logic that we plan to use in expressing knowledge, and describe
the notion of k-models analogous to ‘models’ in classical logic. We define closeness be-
tween k-models and use it to define a particular notion of knowledge update. In Section 3
we discuss minimal change properties of knowledge update. An interesting result shows
that our knowledge update operator satisfies all of the Katsuno and Mendelzon’s update
postulates [16]. In Section 4 we present alternative characterizations of four particular
knowledge updates—gaining knowledge, ignorance, sensing, and forgetting, and show
their equivalence to our original notion of knowledge update. Some of these alternative
characterizations are based on the formulation of reasoning about sensing actions, and thus
our equivalence results can serve as suitable justifications of the intuitiveness of our defi-
nition of knowledge update. In Section 5 we explore sufficiency conditions that guarantee
persistence of knowledge (or ignorance) during a knowledge update. From Section 6 we
start to investigate model checking complexity for knowledge update. In Section 6 we first
give general background on computational complexity. In Section 7 we study the model
checking complexity for the general case of knowledge update. In Section 8 we define a
subclass of knowledge update problems whose model checking can be achieved in polyno-
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update problems whose model checking is lower than the general case. Finally, in Section
10 we conclude this paper with some remarks. We present proofs of all major results in an
Appendix A.
2. Closeness between k-models and knowledge update
In this section, we describe formal definitions for knowledge update. Our formalization
will be based on the semantics of the propositional modal logic S5 with a single agent.
In general, under Kripke semantics, a Kripke structure is a triple (W,R,π), where W is
a set of possible worlds, R is an equivalence relation on W , and π is a truth assignment
function that assigns a propositional valuation to each world in W . Given a Kripke structure
S = (W,R,π), a Kripke interpretation is a pair (S,w), where w ∈ W is referred to as
the actual world of (S,w). To characterize S5 formulas (which we henceforth refer to
simply as ‘formulas’) we follow [6] in defining an entailment relation |= between Kripke
interpretations and formulas.
In the case of a single agent, however, we restrict ourselves to those S5 structures in
which the relation R is universal, i.e. each world is accessible from every world, and worlds
are identified with the set of atoms true at the worlds (see p. 28 in [23]). To simplify a
comparison between two worlds (e.g. Definition 2), we view an atom p to be in a world w
(denoted by p ∈ w) iff p is mapped to true in the world w (denoted by w |= p). Therefore,
in our context a Kripke structure (W,R,π) is uniquely characterized by W and we define
a k-model as a pair M = (W,w), where w indicates the actual world of the agent and W
presents all possible worlds that the agent may access. Note that since we assume R to be
universal, w is in W for any k-model M = (W,w).
In the rest of this paper we assume our language to have a finite number of proposi-
tions. Thus we will be dealing with a finite propositional S5 modal logic. Although, this
may seem restrictive, we make this assumption to keep our focus on the main issue of
the paper—investigation of knowledge updates from a viewpoint of reasoning about an
agent’s knowledge related actions and the associated complexity problems. Our work can
be viewed as an extension of traditional propositional belief update where usually a finite
language is also employed, for example in [16].
We use a, b, c, . . . , p,q, . . . to denote propositional atoms; φ,ψ,υ, . . . to denote propo-
sitional formulas without including modalities (we also call them objective formulas); and
α,β, γ,µ, . . . to denote formulas that may contain modal operator K . For convenience,
we use T ≡ α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αk to represent a finite set of formulas {α1, . . . , αk} and call T a
knowledge set.
Definition 1. Let P be the set of all atomic propositions in the language. The entailment
relation |= under S5 semantics is defined as follows:
(1) (W,w) |= p iff p is an atomic proposition (i.e., p ∈P) and w |= p;
(2) (W,w) |= α ∧ β iff (W,w) |= α and (W,w) |= β;
(3) (W,w) |= ¬α iff it is not the case that (W,w) |= α;
(4) (W,w) |= Kα iff (W,w′) |= α for all w′ ∈ W .
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Following is a list of our definitions and terminologies:
• Given a formula T , (W,w) is called a k-model of T if (W,w) |= T . (Our notion of
k-models is analogous to ‘models’ in propositional logic.)
• We use Mod(T ) to denote the set of all k-models of T .
For an objective formula φ, Mod(φ) simply denotes the set of worlds w where w |= φ.
In this case, w is also called a model of φ.
• For a formula α, we say that T entails α, denoted as T |= α, iff for every k-model
(W,w) of T , (W,w) |= α.
Note that in the rest of the paper, we may also use M to denote a k-model, i.e., M =
(W,w), and in this case we simply write M |= α if α is true in (W,w).
• We say a formula is satisfiable if it has a k-model. (This is analogous to the ‘satisfia-
bility’ of propositional theories.)
• We say two formulas T and α are equivalent, denoted by T ≡ α, iff T |= α and α |= T .
The basic problem of knowledge update that we would like to investigate is formally
described as follows: given a k-model M = (W,w), that is usually viewed as a state of
an agent, and a formula µ—the agent’s new knowledge that may contain modal operator
K , how do we update M to another k-model M ′ = (W ′,w′) such that M ′ |= µ and M ′
is minimally different from M with respect to some criterion? To define such a minimal
difference (or more often called minimal change principle) on k-model update, we first
study a concept of closeness between two k-models with respect to a given k-model.
A widely used definition of closeness [37] between simple worlds is based on the notion
of symmetric difference. According to this definition a world w1 is as close to the world
w as w2 is (denoted by w1 w w2) if (w1 \ w ∪ w \ w1) ⊆ (w2 \ w ∪ w \ w2). When
defining closeness of k-models we give first preference to the comparison between the
actual worlds. Hence, if two k-models M1 = (W1,w1) and M2 = (W2,w2) have different
actual worlds then we define their closeness with respect to a reference k-model M =
(W,w) by simply comparing the symmetric difference between w1 and w, and w2 and w.
When w1 = w2 we need additional comparisons. A straightforward approach would be to
compare the knowledge encoded in each of the k-models. For that we have the following
notation.
• For a k-model M = (W,w), by KM we denote the set {φ | φ is an objective formula
and for all w′ ∈ W we have that w′ |= φ} (here note that w is also in W ).
A simple comparison between the knowledge encoded in M1 and M2 with respect to M
can be done by comparing the symmetric difference between KM1 and KM and KM2 and
KM. We use this comparison but in addition consider two special cases when the symmetric
differences may be incomparable but yet there is reason to consider one k-model to be
closer (to M) than the other. These two special cases are when M1 only loses knowledge
with respect to M , and when M1 only gains knowledge with respect to M .
Consider the case when M1 only loses knowledge with respect to M . In that case if M2
both loses and gains knowledge with respect to M then we consider M1 to be closer to
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Fig. 2. M1 M M2 under the condition w1 = w2 and W1 ⊂ W .
M than M2 is to M . Also, if M2 (like M1) only loses knowledge with respect to M , but
loses more than M1 does then we consider M1 to be closer to M than M2 is to M . This is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
Similarly, consider the case when M1 only gains knowledge with respect to M . In that
case if M2 both loses and gains knowledge with respect to M then we consider M1 to be
more closer to M than M2. Also, if M2 (like M1) only gains knowledge with respect to
M , but gains more than M1 does then we consider M1 to be closer to M than M2. This is
illustrated in Fig. 2.
Note that classifying knowledge change as two special cases of only increasing (gain-
ing) knowledge and only losing (decreasing) knowledge respectively is important in our
formalization. As we will show later, several interesting knowledge update forms belong
to these two types of updates. Also, the computational complexity of these two types of
updates, to be discussed in Sections 8 and 9, are different. We now formally define the
closeness between k-models.
Definition 2 (Closeness between k-models). Let M = (W,w), M1 = (W1,w1) and M2 =
(W2,w2) be three k-models. We say M1 is closer or as close to M as M2, denoted as
M1 M M2, if:
(1) (w1 \ w ∪ w \ w1) ⊂ (w2 \ w ∪ w \ w2); or
(2) w1 = w2 and one of the following conditions holds:
(i) W1 = W2;
(ii) W1 = W2 and if W ⊂ W1, then (a) there exist some φ and ψ such that M |= Kφ
and M2 |= Kφ and M |= Kψ and M2 |= Kψ , or (b) for any φ if M |= Kφ and
M1 |= Kφ, then M2 |= Kφ;
(iii) W1 = W2 and if W1 ⊂ W , then condition (a) above is satisfied, or (c) for any φ if
M |= Kφ and M1 |= Kφ, then M2 |= Kφ;
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(iv) W1 = W2 and if W ⊂ W1 and W1 ⊂ W , then conditions (b) and (c) above are
satisfied;
(v) W1 = W2 and W1 = W .
We denote M1 <M M2 if M1 M M2 and M2 M M1.
Note that Figs. 1 and 2 given earlier illustrate the conditions (2)(ii) and (2)(iii) of the
above definition respectively. Fig. 3 illustrates the condition (2)(iv) of the above definition.
The meaning of condition (2)(v), on the other hand, is quite obvious.
One may argue that Definition 2 above is too strong in terms of knowledge com-
parison, particularly the cases in condition (2)(ii) and (2)(iii) as illustrated by the first
diagrams of Figs. 1 and 2. For instance, let W = {w1,w2, . . . ,w99,w100}, W1 = {w1} and
W2 = {w1,w2, . . . ,w99,w101}, and M = (W,w1),M1 = (W1,w1) and M2 = (W2,w1).
According to Definition 2, we have M1 <M M2. However, it is observed that W1 only has
one world w1 in common with W while W2 has 99 worlds in common with W , yet it is
viewed that M1 is closer to M than M2. Although such argument seems plausible in some
sense, our motivation here is based on the agent’s knowledge instead of just counting the
number of common worlds between two k-models. Let us take a closer look at condition
(2)(iii) which defines M1 <M M2 in our example here. This condition actually says that
(a) M1 has all the knowledge that M has (i.e., W1 ⊂ W ); (b) there exists some knowledge
that M has but M2 does not, and M does not have but M2 has; and (c) for any knowledge
that M1 has but M does not, M2 also has. From statements (a), (b) and (c), it seems reason-
able to us to conclude that M and M1 are closer than M and M2 do. Another way to justify
our formulation is to notice that M1 can be obtained from M by just performing a pure
sensing action, while to obtain M2 from M one has to perform a more complicated action.
Similarly, M can be obtained from M1 by a forgetting action while to obtain M from M2
one has to perform a more complicated action. (We discuss different kinds of actions and
the corresponding knowledge update in greater detail in Section 4.)
On the other hand, in Definition 2, we give higher priority to difference between actual
worlds to difference between the knowledge about the worlds. This is a design decision that
we made. The possibilities were to treat them equally, or treat one more important than the
other. We consider changes in the real world to be harder (needs a physical action) than
changes only in the knowledge. Consider three models M1, M2 and M . Suppose M1 and
M have the same physical part but different knowledge part; and M2 and M have different
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is closer to M than M2. Again, the intuition is that it is harder to change the real world
through physical actions (say to break an object) than to change the knowledge (to lie and
say that the object was broken). Moreover, by giving a higher priority of the real world
change, our revised definition of knowledge update is consistent with updates involving
only actual worlds as well as updates involving only epistemic states.
Now using the notion of closeness between k-models we define k-model update. Our
definition is similar to the definition of belief updates, which is defined using closeness
between worlds.
Definition 3 (k-model update). Let M = (W,w) be a k-model and µ a formula. A k-model
M ′ = (W ′,w′) is called a possible resulting k-model after updating M with µ if and only
if the following conditions hold:
(1) M ′ |= µ;
(2) there does not exist another k-model M ′′ = (W ′′,w′′) such that M ′′ |= µ and
M ′′ <M M ′.
We denote the set of all possible resulting k-models after updating M with µ as Res(M,µ).
Example 1. Let T ≡ Kc ∧ ¬Ka ∧ ¬Kb ∧ K(a ∨ b) and µ ≡ K¬c. We denote
w0 = {a, b, c}, w1 = {a, c}, w2 = {b, c}, w3 = {c},
w4 = {a, b}, w5 = {a}, w6 = {b}, w7 = ∅.
Clearly, M0 = ({w0,w1,w2},w0) is a k-model of T . Consider the update of M0 with µ.
Let M1 = ({w4,w5,w6},w4). Now we show that M1 is a possible resulting k-model after
updating M0 with µ.
Since (w0 \w4 ∪w4 \w0) = {c}, we first consider any possible k-model M ′ = (W ′,w′)
such that (w0 \ w′ ∪ w′ \ w0) ⊂ {c}. Clearly, the only possible w′ would be w0 it-
self. Let M ′ = (W ′,w0), where W ′ is a subset of {w0, . . . ,w7}. However, since c ∈ w0,
there does not exist any W ′ such that M ′ |= K¬c. Therefore, from Definition 2, only
condition (2) can be used to find a possible M ′ such that M ′ <M M1. So we assume
M ′ = (W ′,w4). On the other hand, from M0 and M1, it is easy to see that KM0 = {c, a∨b}
and KM1 = {¬c, a ∨ b}.1 Then we have KM0 \ KM1 = {c} and KM1 \ KM0 = {¬c}. Ignor-
ing the detailed verifications, we can show that there does not exist such M ′ = (W ′,w4)
satisfying KM0 \ KM′ = KM′ \ KM0 = ∅.
Example 2. Let T = a ∧ b ∧ c, and µ = a ∧ b ∧ ¬c. As in the previous example, let us
assume a, b and c are the only propositions in our world. In that case we have eight possible
worlds; w0, . . . ,w7, as given in the previous example.
1 For simplicity, here we only consider the prime formulas φ in KM in the sense that if φ ∈ KM, then there is
not another ψ such that |= ψ ⊃ φ and ψ ∈ KM.
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where W is any subset of {w0, . . . ,w7} containing w0. There are 27 = 128 such W s and
hence T has 128 k-models. Let M be one of these k-models, say M = ({w0, . . . ,w7},w0).
Let us now compute Res(M,µ). Res(M,µ) consists of the unique k-model M ′ =
({w0, . . . ,w7},w4); as w4 is the closest physical world to w0 that satisfies µ, and among
all other k-models of the form (W ′,w4), M ′ is the closest to M . Note that this update
does not result in any change in knowledge. Indeed, since this update does not involve K
operator, the knowledge update is then reduced to the classical PMA update [37].
Using the notion of k-model update we now define the updating of a formula T by
another formula µ as the union of updating every k-model of T with µ. This is similar to
the way belief update is defined in the literature.
Definition 4 (Knowledge update). Let T and µ be two formulas. The update of T with µ,
denoted as T  µ, is defined by Mod(T  µ) =⋃M∈Mod(T ) Res(M,µ).
Example 3. Let T1 = a, and T2 = Ka. Let w0 = {a}, w1 = ∅.
Let W0 = ∅, W1 = {w0}, W2 = {w1}, and W3 = {w0,w1}.
The k-models of T1 are (W1,w0) and (W3,w0). (W0,w0) and (W2,w0) are not k-
models of T1 as neither W0, nor W2 contains w0.
The only k-model of T2 is (W1,w0).
Thus the only k-model of T1  T2 is (W1,w0).
Clearly, Definition 4 is a generalized form of Winslett’s PMA update [37]. It should be
noted that we would not be able to define knowledge update in such a way as in Definition 4
if we allow the underlying language to be infinite, because this would require that the set of
k-models
⋃
M∈Mod(T ) Res(M,µ) be finitely axiomatized and this is usually not possible for
infinite models. On the other hand, we may think that the update operator  as a function
that takes formulas T and µ as parameters and nondeterministically returns a formula
whose models are characterized by the set
⋃
M∈Mod(T ) Res(M,µ). In practice, it is not
feasible to obtain such a specific formula as there may be infinite number of formulas
whose models are represented by
⋃
M∈Mod(T ) Res(M,µ). Nevertheless, since our interest
here is to capture the semantics of knowledge update, we actually do not need to know this
particular formula. Instead, our operations on knowledge will focus on the models, similar
to the approach taken in defining belief updates, e.g. [37].
3. Minimal change of knowledge update
In this section, we investigate minimal change properties of knowledge update. Specif-
ically, we examine the relationship between knowledge update and the classical Katsuno
and Mendelzon’s update postulates [16]. We start with some useful results about knowl-
edge update.
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ing properties hold:
(1) φ ∈ KM1 iff W1 ⊆ Mod(φ);
(2) W1 ⊆ W2 iff KM2 ⊆ KM1;
(3) KM1 = KM2 iff W1 = W2;
(4) Let M ′ = (W1 ∪ W2,w), then KM′ = KM1 ∩ KM2;
(5) Let w′ ∈ W1 ∩ W2 and M ′ = (W1 ∩ W2,w′), then KM1 ∪ KM2 ⊆ KM′.
Readers are reminded that we may flexibly use Proposition 1 to move between sets of
possible worlds and sets of formulas.
Given a set of k-models S and a k-model M , let M be an ordering on S as we defined
in Definition 2. By Min(S,M) we mean the set of all elements in S that are minimal
with respect to ordering M . The following proposition simply shows that M is a partial
ordering.
Proposition 2. Let M be a k-model. Then M defined in Definition 2 is a partial ordering.
The following proposition follows from Definitions 3 and 4.
Proposition 3. Let T and µ be two formulas. Then
Mod(T  µ) =
⋃
M∈Mod(T )
Min
(
Mod(µ),M
)
.
Proof. To prove the result, we only need to show that for each k-model M of T ,
Res(M,µ) = Min(Mod(µ),M). Let M ′ ∈ Res(M,µ). Since M ′ |= µ, M ′ ∈ Mod(µ). On
the other hand, according to Definition 3, for any M ′′ ∈ Mod(µ), we have M ′′ ≮M M ′.
That is, M ′ ∈ Min(Mod(µ),M). So Res(M,µ) ⊆ Min(Mod(µ),M). Similarly, we can
show Min(Mod(µ),M) ⊆ Res(M,µ). 
The above proposition provides an important characterization on knowledge update in
terms of a particular minimal change criterion. Now the question we are interested in is
whether our knowledge update operator satisfies some classical properties of belief (knowl-
edge base) update. In the last decade, belief update has been extensively studied by many
researchers and its difference from belief revision is well understood [14,22,39]. From
the observation of semantic difference between belief update and revision, Katsuno and
Mendelzon [16] argued that the original revision postulates proposed by Gardenfors et al.
[7] are not quite suitable for update, and ignoring such difference may lead to unreason-
able solutions [16]. Instead, Katsuno and Mendelzon [16] proposed alternative postulates
for any update operator  as follows.
(U1) T  µ |= µ.
(U2) If T |= µ then T  µ ≡ T .
(U3) If both T and µ are satisfiable then T  µ is also satisfiable.
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(U5) (T  µ) ∧ α |= T  (µ ∧ α).
(U6) If T  µ1 |= µ2 and T  µ2 |= µ1 then T  µ1 ≡ T  µ2.
(U7) If T is complete (i.e., has a unique k-model) then
(T  µ1) ∧ (T  µ2) |= T  (µ1 ∨ µ2).
(U8) (T1 ∨ T2)  µ ≡ (T1  µ)∨ (T2  µ).
Under the context of S5 modal logic, we assume all the formulas occurring in the above
postulates are S5 formulas. The following theorem shows that our knowledge update oper-
ator satisfies all these postulates.
Theorem 1. Knowledge update operator  defined in Definition 4 satisfies Katsuno and
Mendelzon’s update postulates (U1)–(U8).
It is worth mentioning that in [16] Katsuno and Mendelzon relate their update postulates
for belief updates to the ordering used in defining the updates. We can not use their result
directly for the proof of the above theorem as their result pertains to propositional theories
and ordering between propositional interpretations.
4. Characterizing specific knowledge updates
While the previous section studies general minimal change properties of our knowledge
update, alternative characterizations of knowledge update can be described for several spe-
cific forms. These specific forms present important features of knowledge update, and their
alternative characterizations are convenient when the use of the notion of knowledge up-
date becomes an overkill. For example, the alternative characterization of sensing update
below is a much simpler characterization that is used in reasoning about sensing actions
[26,28].
4.1. Gaining knowledge update
We first introduce a notation that will be useful in our following discussions. Let W be
a set of worlds and w ∈ W . By W(w,φ), we denote the set {w′ | w′ ∈ W and (w′ |= φ iff
w |= φ)}.
Proposition 4. Consider T and Kφ where φ is objective and T |= φ. Then
(1) If M ′ = (W ′,w′) is a k-model of T  Kφ, then there exists a k-model M = (W,w) of
T such that w = w′ and W ′ = W(w,φ);
(2) If M = (W,w) is a k-model of T , then M ′ = (W(w,φ),w) is a k-model of T  Kφ.
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served by a reasoner:2 to know some fact, the agent only needs to restrict the current
possible worlds in each of her k-models, if this fact itself is already entailed by her current
knowledge set. We call this kind of knowledge update gaining knowledge update.
Corollary 1. For an objective formula φ, if T |= φ then T  Kφ |= φ.
Example 4. Let T ≡ a ∧ ¬Ka ∧ Kb. Suppose w0 = {a, b}, w1 = {a}, w2 = {b} and w3 =
∅. Then T has one k-model M = ({w0,w2},w0). Updating M with Ka, according to our
k-model update definition, we have a unique resulting k-model M ′ = ({w0},w0). Indeed,
this result is also obtained from Proposition 4.
4.2. Ignorance update
As a contrary case to the gaining knowledge update, we now characterize an agent
ignoring a fact from her knowledge set which we call ignorance update, i.e., updating T
with ¬Kφ. From Definitions 3 and 4, it is easy to see that T  ¬φ |= ¬Kφ. However, it
should be noted that T  ¬φ can not be used to achieve T  ¬Kφ. Consider a k-model
M = ({{a, b}, {a}}, {a, b}). Updating M with ¬Ka we have a possible resulting k-model
M ′ = ({{a, b}, {a}, {b}}, {a, b}), while updating M with ¬a will lead to a possible result
M ′′ = ({{a, b}, {a}, {b}}, {b}). Note that both M ′ and M ′′ entail ¬Ka, but M ′ <M M ′′
according to Definition 2.
Proposition 5. Consider T and φ where φ is objective.
(1) If M ′ = (W ′,w′) is a k-model of T  ¬Kφ, then there exists a k-model M = (W,w)
of T such that
(i) if M |= Kφ, then w′ = w and W ′ = W ∪ {w∗}, where w∗ |= ¬φ,
(ii) otherwise, w′ = w and W ′ = W ;
(2) If M = (W,w) is a k-model of T , then M ′ = (W ′,w′) is a k-model of T ¬Kφ, where
(i) if M |= Kφ, then w′ = w and W ′ = W ∪ {w∗}, where w∗ |= ¬φ,
(ii) otherwise, w′ = w and W ′ = W .
Example 5. Suppose T ≡ ¬Ka ∧ ¬Kb ∧ K(a ∨ b) ∧ Kc and the agent wants to ig-
nore c. Let w0 = {a, b, c}, w1 = {a, c}, w2 = {b, c}, w3 = {c}, w4 = {a, b}, w5 = {a},
2 Note that the update T µ is done by a third party; not the agent. For example, in the domain of an agent that
needs to use a plan with sensing action (which will give him new knowledge), the planner or plan verifier is the
third party which constructs the plan or verifies if the plan will indeed achieve the goal. In that case T expresses
the state of the world from the third party’s view point. For example if T1 = a, then it means that a is true in
the real world but our agent does not know it. On the other hand if T2 = Ka, then it means that a is true in the
real world and our agent knows it. Similarly, if µ = Ka ∨ K¬a is the effect of a sensing action, then the third
party reasons that after executing that action (or after updating the initial theory by µ) the agent would know
the value of a. In this case updating of T1 with µ will result in T2, and the third party will known that after the
sensing action the agent would know that a is true; while the agent did not know that before the sensing action.
We discuss this further in a later section.
222 C. Baral, Y. Zhang / Artificial Intelligence 164 (2005) 209–243w6 = {b}, w7 = ∅. Clearly, T has three k-models: M0 = ({w0,w1,w2},w0), M1 =
({w0,w1,w2},w1), and M2 = ({w0,w1,w2},w2). From Proposition 4, T  ¬Kc has the
following twelve k-models: ({w0,w1,w2,wi},wj ), where i = 4,5,6,7 and j = 0,1,2.
4.3. Sensing update
Now we consider the case when µ is of the form Kφ ∨ K¬φ where φ is objective.
Updating T with this type of µ is particularly useful in reasoning about sensing actions
[26,28] where Kφ ∨ K¬φ represents the effect of a sensing action that senses φ. After
the execution of such a sensing action an agent will know either φ or ¬φ. We refer to
such an update as a sensing update. The following proposition characterizes the update of
T with a formula of the form Kφ ∨ K¬φ. It is interesting to note that the sufficient and
necessary condition for a k-model of T  (Kφ ∨ K¬φ) is similar to the one presented in
Proposition 4.
Proposition 6. Consider T and µ ≡ Kφ ∨ K¬φ where φ is objective.
(1) If M ′ = (W ′,w′) is a k-model of T  (Kφ ∨ K¬φ), then there exists a k-model M =
(W,w) of T such that w = w′ and W ′ = W(w,φ), or w = w′ and W ′ = W(w,¬φ);
(2) If M = (W,w) is a k-model of T , then M ′ = (W ′,w′) is a k-model of T  (Kφ ∨
K¬φ), where w′ = w and W ′ = W(w,φ), or w′ = w and W ′ = W(w,¬φ).
The following corollary says that if φ is true in the real world then after sensing φ (i.e.,
doing an update with Kφ ∨ K¬φ) an agent will know that φ is true.
Corollary 2. For objective formulas φ, if T |= φ then T  (Kφ ∨ K¬φ) |= Kφ.
Example 6. Suppose T ≡ Kb ∧ ¬Ka ∧ ¬K¬a represents the current knowledge of an
agent. Note that T implies that the agent does not have any knowledge about a. Consider
the update of T with µ ≡ Ka ∨ K¬a which can be thought of as the agent trying to
reason—in the planning or plan verification stage—about a sensing action3 that will give
her the knowledge about a. Let w0 = {a, b},w1 = {b},w2 = {a} and w3 = ∅. It is easy to
see that M0 = ({w0,w1},w0) and M1 = ({w0,w1},w1) are two k-models of T . Then ac-
cording to the above proposition, it is obtained that M ′0 = ({w0},w0) and M ′1 = ({w1},w1)
are the two k-models of T  µ.
4.4. Forgetting update
We now consider another important type of knowledge update, the update of T with
µ ≡ ¬Kφ ∧ ¬K¬φ. This update can be thought of as the result of an agent forgetting
her knowledge about the fact φ. We will refer to such an update as a forgetting update.
3 Such reasoning is necessary in creating plans with sensing actions or verifying such plans. On the other hand
after the execution of a sensing action the agent exactly knows either a or ¬a, and can simply use the notion of
belief update.
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current knowledge set, the agent only needs to expand the set of possible worlds of this
model with exactly one specific world.
Proposition 7. Consider T and µ ≡ ¬Kφ ∧ ¬K¬φ where φ is objective.
(1) If M ′ = (W ′,w′) is a k-model of T  µ, then there exists a k-model M = (W,w) of T
such that
(i) if M |= Kφ, then w′ = w and W ′ = W ∪ {w∗}, where w∗ |= ¬φ;
(ii) if M |= K¬φ, then w′ = w and W ′ = W ∪ {w∗}, where w∗ |= φ;
(iii) otherwise, w′ = w and W ′ = W .
(2) If M = (W,w) is a k-model of T , then M ′ = (W ′,w) is a k-model of T  µ where
(i) if M |= Kφ, then W ′ = W ∪ {w∗}, where w∗ |= ¬φ;
(ii) if M |= K¬φ, then W ′ = W ∪ {w∗}, where w∗ |= φ;
(iii) otherwise, W ′ = W .
Example 7. Suppose T ≡ Kb∧(Ka∨K¬a) represents the current knowledge of an agent.
After executing a forgetting action the agent now would like to update her knowledge with
µ ≡ ¬Ka ∧ ¬K¬a. Let w0 = {a, b},w1 = {b},w2 = {a},w3 = ∅. It is easy to see that
M0 = ({w0},w0) and M1 = ({w1},w1) are the two k-models of T . Then using Proposition
7, we conclude that M ′0 = ({w0,w1},w0), M ′1 = ({w0,w3},w0), M ′2 = ({w1,w0},w1), and
M ′3 = ({w1,w2},w1) are the four k-models of T µ. Note that ({w0,w2},w0) cannot be a
k-model of T  µ according to Proposition 7.
5. Persistence of knowledge and ignorance
Like most systems that do dynamic modeling, knowledge update discussed previously
is non-monotonic in the sense that while adding new knowledge into a knowledge set, some
previous knowledge in the set might be lost. However, it is important to investigate classes
of formulas that are persistent with respect to an update, as this may partially simplify
the underlying inference problem [38]. Furthermore, characterizing persistence is also an
important issue in non-monotonic epistemic logic reasoning because it plays an essential
role in the way of how different states of agent’s knowledge can be compared [5,31,32].
Given T and µ, a formula α is said to be persistent with respect to the update of T
with µ, if T |= α implies T  µ |= α. If α is of the form Kφ, we call this persistence as
knowledge persistence, while if α is of the form ¬Kφ, we call it ignorance persistence.
The question that we address now is that under what conditions, a formula α is persistent
with respect to the update of T with µ.
As the update of T with µ is achieved based on the update of every k-model of T with
µ, our task reduces to the study of persistence with respect to a k-model update. This is
defined in the following definition.
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and M be a k-model. α is persistent with respect to the update of M with µ if for any
M ′ ∈ Res(M,µ), M |= α implies M ′ |= α.
Clearly a formula α is persistent with respect to the update of T with µ if and only
if for each k-model M of T , α is persistent with respect to the update of M with µ. To
characterize the persistence property with respect to k-model updates, we first define a
preference ordering on k-models in terms of a formula.
Definition 6 (Formula closeness). Let µ be a formula and M1 and M2 be two k-models.
We say that M1 is as close to µ as M2, denoted as M1 µ M2, if one of the following
conditions holds:
(1) M1 ∈ Mod(µ);
(2) M1,M2 /∈ Mod(µ), and for any M ∈ Mod(µ), M1 M M2.
We denote M1 <µ M2 if M1 µ M2 and M2 µ M1.
Intuitively, the above definition specifies a partial ordering to measure the closeness
between two k-models to a formula. In particular, if M1 is a k-model of µ, then M1 is
closer to µ than all other k-models (i.e., condition (1)). If neither M1 nor M2 is a k-model
of µ, then the comparison between M1 and M2 with respect to µ is defined based on the
k-model preference ordering M for each k-model M of µ (i.e., condition (2)). Note that
if both M1 and M2 are k-models of µ, we have M1 µ M2 and M2 µ M1, and both of
them are equally close to µ.
Example 8. Let µ ≡ Ka ∧ Kb, w0 = {a, b}, w1 = {b}, w2 = {a} and w3 = ∅. Clearly, µ
has one k-model M = ({w0},w0). Consider two k-models M1 = ({w0,w1},w0) and M2 =
({w1,w2},w1). Now let us compare which one of them is closer to µ. Since neither M1
nor M2 is a k-model of µ, we can use condition (2) in Definition 6 to compare M1 and M2.
According to Definition 2, it is easy to see that M1 M M2 as w0 \w1 ∪w1 \w0 = {a} = ∅.
Therefore, we conclude M1 µ M2. Furthermore, we also have M1 <µ M2.
Proposition 8. Let µ be a formula. For any two k-models M1 and M2, if M1 µ M2, then
M2 |= µ implies M1 |= µ.
Proof. Suppose M2 |= µ. Then M2 ∈ Mod(µ). From Definition 6, we know that for any
other k-model M ′, M2 µ M ′. So M2 µ M1. But we have M1 µ M2. This implies that
both M1 and M2 are equally close to µ. Hence, M1 |= µ. 
Given a formula µ and a sequence of k-models M1, . . . ,Mk , if the relation M1 µ
M2 µ · · ·µ Mk holds, then it means that Mi is closer to µ than Mj , where i < j . Now
under this condition, if there is another formula α which satisfies the property that Mj |= α
implies Mi |= α whenever i < j , we say that formula α is persistent with respect to formula
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k-models. The following definition formalizes this idea.
Definition 7 (µ-persistence). Let α, µ be two formulas. We say that α is µ-persistent
if for any two k-models M1 and M2, M2 |= α and M1 µ M2 implies M1 |= α.
Now we have the following important relationship between µ-persistence and k-
model update persistence.
Theorem 2. Let α and µ be two formulas and M be a k-model. α is persistent with respect
to the update of M with µ if α is µ-persistent.
Proof. Let M ′ be a k-model in Res(M,µ). Then we have M ′ ∈ Mod(µ). So for any k-
model M ′′, we have M ′ µ M ′′. So M ′ µ M . Now suppose α is µ-persistent. It follows
that M |= α implies M ′ |= α. As M ′ is an arbitrary k-model in Res(M,µ), we can conclude
that α is persistent with respect to the update of M with µ. 
From Theorem 2, we have that µ-persistence is a sufficient condition to guarantee a
formula’s persistence with respect to a k-model update. As will be shown next, we can
provide a unique characterization for µ-persistence. We first define the notion of ordering
preservation as follows.
Definition 8 (Ordering preservation). Given two formulas α and β . We say that ordering
α preserves orderingβ if for any two k-models M1 and M2, M1 α M2 implies M1 β
M2.
The intuition behind ordering preservation is clear. That is, if α preserves β , then
for any two k-models M1 and M2, whenever M1 is closer to α than M2, M1 will be closer
to β than M2 as well. Finally, we have the following important result to characterize µ-
persistence.
Theorem 3. Given two formulas α and µ, α is µ-persistent if and only if µ preserves
α .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose α isµ-persistent. That is, for any two k-models M1 and M2, M1 µ
M2 and M2 |= α implies M1 |= α. So under the constraint that α is µ-persistent, whenever
M1 µ M2, we have M1 α M2. That means, µ preserves α .
(⇐) Suppose µ preserves α . From Definition 8, we have that for any two k-models
M1 and M2, M1 µ M2 implies M1 α M2. Now suppose M1 µ M2. So we have M1 α
M2. From Proposition 7, we have that M2 |= α implies M1 |= α. From this it follows that
α is µ-persistent. 
226 C. Baral, Y. Zhang / Artificial Intelligence 164 (2005) 209–2436. Background on computational complexity
In the rest of this paper, we consider complexity issues of knowledge update. In particu-
lar, we investigate the computational complexity of model checking for knowledge update.
We first introduce basic notions from complexity theory and refer to [8] for further
details. Two important complexity classes are P and NP. The class of P includes those
decision problems solvable by a polynomial-time deterministic Turing machine. The class
of NP, on the other hand, consists of those decision problems solvable by a polynomial-
time nondeterministic Turing machine.
Let C be a class of decision problems. The class P C consists of the problems solvable
by a polynomial-time deterministic Truing machine with an oracle for a problem from C,
while the class NPC includes the problems solvable by a nondeterministic Turing machine
with an oracle for a problem in C. By co-C we mean the class consisting of the complements
of the problems in C.
The classes Pk and 	
P
k of the polynomial hierarchy are defined as follows:
P0 = 	P0 = P, and
Pk = NP
P
k−1 , 	Pk = co-Pk for all k > 1.
It is easy to see that NP = P1 and co-NP = 	P1 . A problem A is complete for a class C if
A ∈ C and for every problem B in C there is a polynomial transformation of B to A.
The prototypical Pk -complete and 	
P
k -complete problems are deciding the validity of
quantified Boolean formulas (QBFs) of the form:
Q1X1Q2X2 . . .QkXkE, k  1, (1)
where E is a Boolean expression using propositional atoms over alphabets X1,X2, . . ., and
Xk , and the Qi ’s are alternating qualifiers from {∀,∃} (1 i  k). If Q1 = ∃, then deciding
the validity of (1) is Pk -complete, while deciding the validity of (1) is 	Pk -complete if
Q1 = ∀.
Let X and Y be two finite set of propositional atoms where X and Y have the same
cardinality, i.e., |X| = |Y |. For convenience, we use notions X ≡ Y to stand for formula
(x1 ≡ y1)∧ (x2 ≡ y2)∧ · · · ∧ (xm ≡ ym). Consequently, X ≡ ¬Y stands for formula (x1 ≡
¬y1)∧ (x2 ≡ ¬y2) ∧ · · · ∧ (xm ≡ ¬ym). We also use ¬X to denote the set {¬xi | xi ∈ X}
(or formula∧xi∈X ¬xi ), and use notion∨¬X to stand for formula∨xi∈X ¬xi . For a given
formula α, we use |α| to denote the length of α.
The problem of model checking for knowledge update is described as follows: Given a
knowledge set T , a formula µ, and a k-model M , deciding whether M ∈ Mod(T µ). It is
well known that the model checking problem for traditional belief revision and update is
located at the lower end of the polynomial hierarchy from P to P2 depending on specific
revision/update operators and additional restrictions (if any) [19].
7. Complexity of model checking: General case
In this section, we investigate the complexity of model checking for the general case of
knowledge update. When we say complexity of model checking we mean the complexity
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assume that the representation of k-model M is such that all k-models need the same (or
at most polynomial in the size of M) number of bits for representation.
Lemma 1. Let M = (W,w),M1 = (W1,w1) and M2 = (W2,w2) be three k-models.
(1) Deciding whether KM \ KM2 = ∅ and KM2 \ KM = ∅ has time complexity O(|W | ×
|W2|).
(2) Deciding whether KM \ KM1 ⊆ KM \ KM2 has time complexity O(|W1| × (|W | +
|W2|)).
(3) Deciding whether KM1 \KM ⊆ KM2 \KM has time complexityO(|W1|×|W |×|W2|).
Lemma 2. Let M,M1 and M2 be three k-models. Deciding whether M1 M M2 can be
achieved in polynomial time in the size of the input: M,M1 and M2.
Proof. According to Definition 2, if w1 = w2, then M1 M M2 iff (w1 \ w ∪ w \ w1) ⊆
(w2 \ w ∪ w \ w2). Clearly, this can be verified in polynomial time. If w1 = w2, then we
need to check the following conditions: (i) If W ⊆ W1, then M1 M M2 iff condition (a) or
(b) in Definition 2 is satisfied. From Lemma 1, we know that deciding whether (a) and (b)
are true can be done in polynomial time. (ii) If W1 ⊆ W , then M1 M M2 iff condition (a)
or (c) in Definition 2 is satisfied. From Lemma 1, deciding whether (c) is true is in P. (iii)
If W ⊂ W1 and W1 ⊂ W , then M1 M M2 iff conditions (b) and (c) should be satisfied.
Again, deciding whether condition (c) is true is in polynomial time. So, the problem is
in P. 
Lemma 3. Let M,M ′ be two k-models and µ a S5 formula. Deciding whether M ′ ∈
Res(M,µ) is in co-NP (in terms of the size of M,M ′ and µ).
Proof. According to Proposition 3, if M ′ /∈ Res(M,µ), there must exist another k-model
M ′′ such that M ′′ <M M ′. A guess of a k-model M ′′ can be done in polynomial time.
From Lemma 2, deciding whether M ′′ M M ′ is in P (with respect to the size of M,M ′
and M ′′). Since M ′′ <M M ′ iff M ′′ M M ′ and M ′ M M ′′, and since we assume that in
our representation of k-models, all k-models need same number of bits for representation,
it follows that checking whether M ′′ <M M ′ can be decided in polynomial time. So the
problem is in co-NP. 
Theorem 4. Model checking for knowledge update is in P2 .
Proof. From Definition 4, M ∈ Mod(T µ) iff for some M ′ ∈ Mod(T ), M ∈ Res(M ′,µ).
A guess of M ′ and check whether M ′ ∈ Mod(T ), i.e., M ′ |= T , can be achieved in polyno-
mial time. According to Lemma 3, deciding whether M ∈ Res(M ′,µ) can be solved with
one call to a co-NP oracle. So the problem is in P2 . 
The above result shows that model checking for knowledge update is in the same layer
of the polynomial hierarchy as the traditional model based belief update. It should be noted
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from the input for model checking in belief updates [18,19].
7.1. Knowledge gradual update
The hardness can be simply proved by reducing model checking for Winslett’s update
operator [37] to our knowledge update operator, then following Liberatore and Schaerf’s
result [19], the hardness follows.
However, here we will present a different hardness proof because our proof gives rise
a new subclass of knowledge update problems (yet different from Winslett’s belief up-
date) which can be viewed as a lower bound for knowledge update problems that are
P2 -complete for model checking (see sections 8 and 9 for other subclasses of knowledge
update problems).
Given T and µ, we say the update of T with µ is knowledge gradual if for any k-
model M ′ = (W ′,w′) of T  µ, there exists a k-model M = (W,w) of T such that either
W ⊆ W ′ or W ′ ⊆ W . Note that, after performing a knowledge gradual update, the agent’s
knowledge may be decreased or increased (or without change), and the agent’s actual world
may be changed as well.
Example 9. Let T = a ∧ ¬Ka and µ = K¬a. Obviously, T has a unique k-model
M = ({{a},∅}, {a}). Then updating M with µ generates a unique k-model of T  µ:
M ′ = ({∅},∅). Obviously, M ′ has increased knowledge from M and the actual world of
M ′ is also different from M’s.
Theorem 5. Model checking for knowledge update is P2 -complete. The hardness holds
even if the update is knowledge gradual.
8. A tractable subclass—knowledge decreased update
In this section, we identify a subclass of knowledge update problems for which model
checking can be achieved in polynomial time. We first introduce a useful notation. Let α be
a S5 formula and φα be an objective formula (i.e. no K occurs in it) occurring in α. We then
say φα is an objective sub-formula of α. We denote the set of all objective sub-formulas of
α as Subo(α). For instance, given α = Ka ∨ K¬b, Subo(α) = {a, b,¬b}.
Definition 9. Given S5 formulas T and µ, updating T with µ is called knowledge de-
creased if for any k-model M ′ = (W ′,w′) of T  µ, there exists a k-model M = (W,w)
of T such that (i) W ⊆ W ′ and w = w′; and (ii) there exists some φµ ∈ Subo(µ), such that
W = {w∗ | w∗ ∈ W ′ and w∗ |= φµ} or W = {w∗ | w∗ ∈ W ′ and w∗ |= ¬φµ}.
From the above definition, it is easy to see that if an update is knowledge decreased,
then the actual world of the agent’s state will not change, and the agent’s knowledge can
only be decreased. Furthermore, the set of possible worlds in the agent’s original state can
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the model checking for knowledge decreased update.
Theorem 6. Model checking for knowledge decreased update can be achieved in polyno-
mial time.
Proof. Given T , µ and a k-model M ′ = (W ′,w′). Suppose T µ be knowledge decreased.
To check whether M ′ ∈ Mod(T  µ), we need to do the following things:
(1) Check whether M ′ |= µ;
(2) Compute a subset W of W ′ such that for any w∗ ∈ W ′, w∗ ∈ W iff w∗ |= φµ or w∗ |=
¬φµ for some φµ ∈ Subo(µ);
(3) Check whether (W,w) |= T .
Clearly, steps (1) and (3) can be done in polynomial time. As |Subo(µ)| |µ|, it follows
that step (2) can be also done in polynomial time. 
It is worthwhile to mention specific forms of knowledge decreased update which, as we
have presented earlier, have important applications in practical domains.
Theorem 7. Ignorance and forgetting updates are knowledge decreased.
Proof. The proof directly follows from Propositions 5 and 7 respectively. 
Corollary 3. Model checking for ignorance and forgetting updates can be achieved in
polynomial time.
9. An intractable subclass—knowledge increased update
In this section, we address another subclass of knowledge update problems whose model
checking complexity are intractable but lower than the general case. Such investigation
will be useful for us to design efficient model checking algorithms for these subclasses of
update problems.
As a contrary case to the knowledge decreased update, the knowledge increased update
is defined as follows.
Definition 10. Given T and µ, updating T with µ is called knowledge increased if for
any k-model M ′ = (W ′,w′) of T  µ, there exists a k-model M = (W,w) of T such that
(i) W ′ ⊆ W , and w = w′; and (ii) there exists some φµ ∈ Subo(µ), such that W ′ = {w∗ |
w∗ ∈ W and w∗ |= φµ} or W ′ = {w∗ | w∗ ∈ W and w∗ |= ¬φµ}.
It is clear that if a knowledge increased update is performed to an agent’s knowledge set,
it only increases the agent’s knowledge and does not change the agent’s actual world. Un-
fortunately, different from the knowledge decreased update, the model checking problem
for knowledge increased update is not tractable.
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It is interesting to note that some specific forms of knowledge update we discussed
earlier such as gaining knowledge and sensing updates are knowledge increased.
Theorem 9. Gaining knowledge and sensing updates are knowledge increased.
Proof. The proof directly follows from Propositions 4 and 6 respectively. 
Corollary 4. Model checking for gaining knowledge and sensing updates are NP-complete.
10. Conclusions
In this paper we developed an explicit notion of knowledge update as an analogous no-
tion to belief update and illustrated its usefulness in characterizing the knowledge change
of an agent in presence of new knowledge. In our formulation, knowledge update is par-
ticularly relevant in reasoning about actions and plan verifications when there are sensing
or forgetting actions. We presented simpler alternative characterization of knowledge up-
date for particular cases, and showed its equivalence to the original characterization. We
discussed when particular knowledge (or ignorance) persists with respect to a knowledge
update. We also undertook a further study about the complexity issue of knowledge up-
date. In particular, we analyzed the complexity of model checking for knowledge update
in the general case and in special cases. We identify special subcases where the model
checking is either tractable or its complexity is lower than the general case. We expect that
these results will be useful for designing more optimal model checking algorithms in the
implementation of knowledge update.
We believe our work here to be a starting point on knowledge update, and as evident
from the research in belief update and revision in the past decade, a lot needs to be done
in knowledge update. For example, issues such as multi-agent knowledge update, iterative
knowledge update, abductive knowledge update, minimal knowledge in knowledge up-
date, etc. remain to be explored. Similarly, in regards to reasoning about actions, additional
specific cases of knowledge update need to be identified and simpler alternative character-
ization for them need to be developed. On the other hand, as our knowledge update is
developed based on Kripke models, it may be integrated into model checking formalism
so that a unified system of model checking and model updating can be used not only for
automatic system verification but also for automatic system modification.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proposition 1. Let M1 = (W1,w1) and M2 = (W2,w2) be two k-models. Then the follow-
ing properties hold:
(1) φ ∈ KM1 iff W1 ⊆ Mod(φ);
(2) W1 ⊆ W2 iff KM2 ⊆ KM1;
(3) KM1 = KM2 iff W1 = W2;
(4) Let M ′ = (W1 ∪ W2,w), then KM′ = KM1 ∩ KM2;
(5) Let w′ ∈ W1 ∩ W2 and M ′ = (W1 ∩ W2,w′), then KM1 ∪ KM2 ⊆ KM′.
Note that under the finite model restriction, the above results are simply those statements
presented in Exercise 3.1.7.1, Exercise 3.1.7.2 and Exercise 3.1.6.2 of [23]. For readers’
convenience, here we still present our complete proof as follows.
Proof. (1) (⇒) From φ ∈ KM1, we have for all w′ ∈ W1, w′ |= φ (note that φ is a formula
without containing modal operator K). That is, w′ ∈ Mod(φ). So W1 ⊆ Mod(φ).
(⇐) Suppose W1 ⊆ Mod(φ). Then we have for any w′ ∈ W1, w′ |= φ. That is, φ ∈ KM1.
(2) Let∧KM1 and∧KM2 be the conjunctions of all prime formulas in KM1 and KM2
respectively. Then it is clear that Mod(
∧
KM1) = W1 and Mod(∧KM2) = W2. So we have
KM2 ⊆ KM1 iff Mod(∧KM1) ⊆ Mod(∧KM2) iff W1 ⊆ W2.
(3) In the proof of (2), we stated that Mod(∧KM1) = W1 and Mod(∧KM2) = W2. So
KM1 = KM2 iff Mod(∧KM1) = Mod(∧KM2) iff W1 = W2.
(4) According to the definition of M ′, we have φ ∈ KM′ iff for all w′ ∈ W1 ∪W2, w′ |= φ
iff for all w′ ∈ W1, w′ |= φ and for all w′′ ∈ W2, w′′ |= φ iff φ ∈ KM1 and φ ∈ MK2 iff
φ ∈ KM1 ∩ KM2.
(5) If φ ∈ KM1 ∪ KM2, we have φ ∈ KM1 or φ ∈ KM2. So either for all w1 ∈ W1, we
have w1 |= φ or for all w2 ∈ W2, we have w2 |= φ. In either case, for any w′ ∈ W1 ∩ W2,
we have w′ |= φ. That is, φ ∈ KM′. 
Proposition 2. Let M be a k-model. Then M defined in Definition 2 is a partial ordering.
Proof. From Definition 2, it is clear that M is reflexive and antisymmetric. Now we
prove M is also transitive. Let M = (W,w), M1 = (W1,w1), M2 = (W2,w2) and M3 =
(W3,w3) be k-models, and M1 M M2 and M2 M M3. Now we prove M1 M M3.
Case 1. Suppose M1 M M2 is due to condition (1) in Definition 2, i.e., (w1 \ w ∪ w \
w1) ⊂ (w2 \w∪w \w2). Consider M2 M M3. According to Definition 2, either condition
(1) or (2) is satisfied. If condition (1) is satisfied, then (w2\w∪w\w2) ⊂ (w3\w∪w\w3).
This follows (w1 \ w ∪ w \ w1) ⊂ (w3 \ w ∪ w \ w3). So M1 M M3. If condition (2) is
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therefore M1 M M3.
Case 2. Now suppose M1 M M2 is due to condition (2) in Definition 2, i.e., w1 = w2
and one of conditions (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) is satisfied. If M2 M M3 is due to condition
(1) in Definition 2, i.e., (w2 \w ∪w \w2) ⊂ (w3 \w ∪w \w3), it follows that M1 M M3
because w1 = w2. Suppose M2 M M3 is due to condition (2) in Definition 2, that is,
w2 = w3 and one of conditions (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) is satisfied. Here we only consider
the following three cases, while all other cases can be proved in a similar way.
Case 2.1. Both M1 M M2 and M2 M M3 are due to condition (2) and (ii) in De-
finition 2. Under this case, we can only have (a) KM3 ⊂ KM2 ⊂ KM1 ⊂ KM; or (b)
KM2 ⊂ KM1 ⊂ KM but KM \ KM2 = ∅ and KM2 \ KM = ∅. Clearly, in either case, we
have M1 M M3.
Case 2.2. M1 M M2 is due to condition (2) and (ii) and M2 M M3 are due to condi-
tion (2) and (iii) in Definition 2. By analyzing Definition 2, it concludes that this situation
will never occur. This is because from M1 M M2, we can only have either KM2 ⊂ KM or
KM \ KM2 = ∅ and KM2 \ KM = ∅, and from M2 M M3, we can only have KM ⊂ KM2.
Obviously, these two cases conflict with each other.
Case 2.3. M1 M M2 is due to condition (2) and (ii) and M2 M M3 are due to condi-
tion (2) and (iv) in Definition 2. Using (2)(ii), we will have KM1 ⊂ KM and KM2 \KM = ∅
and KM \ KM2 = ∅. Using (2)(iv) we have KM2 \ KM ∪ KM \ KM2 ⊆ KM3 \ KM ∪ KM \
KM3. Thus we have KM1 ⊂ KM and KM3 \ KM = ∅ and KM \ KM3 = ∅. This implies
M1 M M3. 
Theorem 1. Knowledge update operator  defined in Definition 4 satisfies Katsuno and
Mendelzon’s update postulates (U1)–(U8).
Proof. From Definitions 3 and 4, it is easy to verify  satisfies postulates (U1)–(U4). For
illustration purposes we give the proof of (U1). Let (W,w) be an arbitrary k-model of
T  µ. To show (U1) we need to show that (W,w) |= µ. By Definition 4, there must exist
a model M = (W ′,w′) of T such that (W,w) ∈ Res(M,µ). By Definition 3, for (W,w) to
be in Res(M,µ), it must be the case that (W,w) |= µ.
Now we prove  satisfies (U5). To prove that (T µ)∧ α |= T  (µ∧ α), it is sufficient
to prove that for each k-model of T , say M , Res(M,µ) ∩ Mod(α) ⊆ Res(M,µ ∧ α). In
particular, we need to show for any M ′ ∈ Res(M,µ) ∩ Mod(α), M ′ ∈ Res(M,µ ∧ α).
Suppose M ′ /∈ Res(M,µ ∧ α). According to Definition 3, we have (1) M ′ |= µ ∧ α; or (2)
there exists another k-model M ′′ such that M ′′ |= µ ∧ α and M ′′ <M M ′. If it is case (1),
it follows that M ′ /∈ Res(M,µ) ∩ Mod(α). Then the result holds. If it is case (2), it also
implies that M ′′ |= µ and M ′′ <M M ′. That means, M ′ /∈ Res(M,µ) from Definition 3.
The result still holds.
Now we prove  satisfies (U6). Similarly, to prove  satisfies (U6), we only need
to prove for any k-model of T , say M , if Res(M,µ1) ⊆ Mod(µ2) and Res(M,µ2) ⊆
Mod(µ1), then Res(M,µ1) = Res(M,µ2). We first prove Res(M,µ1) ⊆ Res(M,µ2). Let
M ′ ∈ Res(M,µ1). Then M ′ |= µ2. Suppose M ′ /∈ Res(M,µ2). It follows that there exists
another M ′′ ∈ Res(M,µ2) such that M ′′ <M M ′. Also note that M ′′ |= µ1. This contradicts
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prove Res(M,µ2) ⊆ Res(M,µ1).
Now we prove  satisfies (U7). Since T is complete, it follows that T has a unique
k-model M . So we only need to prove Res(M,µ1) ∩ Res(M,µ2) ⊆ Res(M,µ1 ∨ µ2).
Let M ′ ∈ Res(M,µ1) ∩ Res(M,µ2). Suppose M ′ /∈ Res(M,µ1 ∨ µ2). Then there exists
a k-model M ′′ ∈ Res(M,µ1 ∨ µ2) such that M ′′ <M M ′. Note that M ′′ |= µ1 ∨ µ2. If
M ′′ |= µ1, it will follow that M ′ /∈ Res(Mu,µ1), otherwise, M ′ /∈ Res(Mu,µ2). In either
case, we have M ′ /∈ Res(M,µ1) ∩ Res(M,µ2). This proves the result.
Finally, the fact that  satisfies (U8) is obtained straightforward from Definitions 3
and 4. 
Proposition 4. Consider T and φ where φ is objective and T |= φ. Then
(1) If M ′ = (W ′,w′) is a k-model of T  Kφ, then there exists a k-model M = (W,w) of
T such that w = w′ and W ′ = W(w,φ);
(2) If M = (W,w) is a k-model of T , then M ′ = (W(w,φ),w) is a k-model of T  Kφ.
Proof. To prove this proposition, we first prove the following result:
Consider T and Kφ where φ is objective and T |= φ. Let M = (W,w) be a k-model of
T and M ′ = (W(w,φ),w). For any M ′′ ∈ Mod(Kφ) and M ′′ = M ′, M ′ <M M ′′.
It is easy to see that for any M ′′ = (W ′′,w′′) ∈ Mod(Kφ), where w′′ = w, M ′ <M
M ′′. Now let us consider M ′′ = (W ′′,w), where W ′′ = W(w,φ). We consider the following
possible cases.
Case 1. W ′′ ⊂ W(w,φ) (proper set inclusion). Since W(w,φ) ⊆ W , from Proposition 3,
we have KM ⊆ KM′ ⊂ KM′′, and hence KM′ \ KM ⊂ KM′′ \ KM. From Definition 2, it
follows M ′ M M ′′ and M ′′ M M ′, that is, M ′ <M M ′′.
Case 2. W(w,φ) ⊂ W ′′ (proper set inclusion). Without loss of generality, we assume
W ′′ = W(w,φ) ∪{wi}, where wi |= φ. Clearly, wi /∈ W otherwise we will have wi ∈ W(w,φ)
and then W ′′ = W(w,φ). Since W ′′ ⊆ W and W ⊆ W ′′, from Proposition 3, we have KM ⊆
KM′′ and KM′ ⊆ KM. Then it must be the case that KM \ KM′′ = ∅ and KM′′ \ KM = ∅.
From Definition 2 (i.e., (iii) in condition 2), we know that M ′ M M ′′ and M ′′ M M ′.
Case 3. W(w,φ) ⊂ W ′′ and W ′′ ⊂ W(w,φ). Without loss of generality, we can assume
that W ′′ = W(w,φ) ∪ {wi} \ {wj }, where wj ∈ W(w,φ). Since we require that M ′′ |= Kφ,
it follows that wi |= φ. Also, from the construction of W(w,φ), we know that wi /∈ W
otherwise it reduces to the case that W ′′ ⊆ W(w,φ). Therefore, W ′′ ⊆ W and W ⊆ W ′′.
From the above discussion, it follows that KM \ KM′′ = ∅ and KM′′ \ KM = ∅. So from
Definition 2, we know that M ′ M M ′′ and M ′′ M M ′.
Now by using the above result, we prove statements (1) and (2).
Proof of (1). M ′ = (W ′,w′) is a k-model of T  Kφ iff M ′ ∈ Mod(T  Kφ) iff there
exists a k-model M of T , such that M ′ ∈ Res(M,Kφ) iff M ′ ∈ Min(Mod(Kφ),M) for
some M ∈ Mod(T ). We now argue that this implies W ′ = W(w,φ) and w′ = w. Suppose
this is not the case. Then let M∗ = (W(w,φ),w). By the above result we then have M∗ <M
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and W ′ = W(w,φ) and w′ = w.
Proof of (2). Let M = (W,w) be a k-model of T . It is easy to see that M ′ = (W(w,φ),w)
is a model of Kφ. All we need to show is that M ′ ∈ Min(Mod(Kφ),M). This follows
from the above result we have proved. 
Proposition 5. Consider T and φ where φ is objective.
(1) If M ′ = (W ′,w′) is a k-model of T  ¬Kφ, then there exists a k-model M = (W,w)
of T such that
(i) if M |= Kφ, then w′ = w and W ′ = W ∪ {w∗}, where w∗ |= ¬φ,
(ii) otherwise, w′ = w and W ′ = W ;
(2) If M = (W,w) is a k-model of T , then M ′ = (W ′,w′) is a k-model of T ¬Kφ, where
(i) if M |= Kφ, then w′ = w and W ′ = W ∪ {w∗}, where w∗ |= ¬φ,
(ii) otherwise, w′ = w and W ′ = W .
Proof. To prove this proposition, we first prove the following result:
Consider T and φ where φ is objective. Let M = (W,w) be a k-model of T , M |= Kφ,
and M ′ = (W ′,w), where W ′ = W ∪ {w∗}, w∗ |= ¬φ. Then for any k-model M ′′ ∈
Mod(¬Kφ) and M ′′ = M ′, M ′ <M M ′′.
Since M = (W,w) is a k-model of T it is easy to see that for two k-models M ′ =
(W ′,w′) and M ′′ = (W ′′,w′′) such that M ′ |= µ and M ′′ |= µ, and w′ = w and w′′ = w,
M ′ <M M ′′. So M ′′ can not be a k-model of T  µ. In other words, a k-model of T  µ
must have the form M ′ = (W ′,w).
From Proposition 3, to prove the result, we only need to show that for any k-model
M ′′ = (W ′′,w) such that M ′′ ∈ Mod(¬Kφ) and W ′′ = W ∪{w∗} where w∗ |= ¬φ, M ′ <M
M ′′.
Note M |= Kφ. Let M ′ = (W ∪ {w∗},w), where w∗ |= ¬φ. We first show that for any
k-model M ′′ = (W ′′,w) such that M ′′ |= ¬Kφ and W ′′ does not have a form of W ∪ {wi},
M ′ <M M ′′.
Case 1. Suppose W ′ ⊂ W ′′. This implies that KM′′ ⊆ KM′ ⊆ KM from Proposition 1.
So M ′ <M M ′′ according to Definition 2 (condition (b)).
Case 2. Suppose W ′′ ⊂ W ′. Without loss of generality, we assume that W ′′ = W ∪
{w∗} \ {wj } where wj ∈ W . This follows that W ⊂ W ′′ and W ′′ ⊂ W . So it is the case that
KM \ KM′′ = ∅ and KM′′ \ KM = ∅. On the other hand, we have W ⊆ W ′, from Definition
2 (i.e., condition (a)), we have M ′ <M M ′′.
Case 3. Suppose W ′′ ⊂ W ′ and W ′ ⊂ W ′′. Without loss of generality, we can assume
that W ′′ = W ∪ {w∗,wi} \ {wj }, where wj ∈ W and w∗,wi /∈ W . Again, this results to the
situation that W ⊂ W ′′ and W ′′ ⊂ W . From the above discussion, it implies that M ′ <M
M ′′.
Now we show that for any k-model M ′′ that is of the form M ′′ = (W ∪ {wi},w) and wi
is any world such that wi |= ¬φ (note M |= Kφ), M ′ M M ′′ and M ′′ M M ′. Suppose
M ′ M M ′′. Since W ⊂ W ∪ {w∗}, then according to Definition 2, condition (a) or (b)
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(b) must be satisfied. That is, for any ψ such that M |= Kψ and M ′ |= Kψ , M ′′ |= Kψ .
However, this implies that KM \ KM′ ⊆ KM \ KM′′, and also KM ∩ KM′′ ⊆ KM ∩ KM′.
From Proposition 1 (Results 2 and 4), it follows that W ∪ W ′ ⊆ W ∪ W ′′, that is, W ∪
{w∗} ⊆ W ∪ {wi}. Obviously, this is not true. Similarly, we can show that M ′′ M M ′.
That means, both M ′ and M ′′ are in Res(M,µ). This completes our proof for the above
result.
By using this result, we now prove statements (1) and (2).
Proof of (1). M ′ = (W ′,w′) is a k-model of T  ¬Kφ iff M ′ ∈ Mod(T  ¬Kφ) iff
M ′ ∈ Min(Mod(¬Kφ),M) for some M ∈ Mod(T ). Now we prove that if M |= Kφ then
W ′ = W ∪ {w∗}, where w∗ |= ¬φ and w′ = w; otherwise M ′ = M = (W,w).
First, if M |= Kφ, that means |= ¬Kφ. In this case, according to Definition 3,
Res(M,¬Kφ) = {M}, i.e., no any change will be made. So M ′ = M . Now we consider
M |= Kφ. We will show that in this case w′ = w and W ′ = W ∪ {w∗}, where w∗ |= ¬φ.
Assume that this is not the case. So either w′ = w or W ′ = W ∪ {w∗}, where w∗ |= ¬φ. If
w′ = w, it is quite clear that for any M ′′ = (W ′′,w) ∈ Mod(¬Kφ), M ′′ <M M ′, this con-
tradicts with M ′ ∈ Min(Mod(¬Kφ),M). Now assume W ′ = W ∪{w∗}, where w∗ |= ¬φ.
In this case, from the above result we proved, it follows that there exists a k-model
M∗ = (W ∗,w), where W ∗ = W ∪ {w∗}, where w∗ |= ¬φ, M∗ <M M ′. Hence it also con-
tradicts with M ′ ∈ Min(Mod(¬Kφ),M).
Proof of (2). Let M = (W,w) be a k-model of T and M |= Kφ. It is easy to see that
M ′ = (W ′,w), where W ′ = W ∪ {{w∗} and w∗ |= ¬φ is a k-model of ¬Kφ. All we need
to show it that M ′ ∈ Min(Mod(¬Kφ,M). This is followed from the above result we have
proved. On the other hand, if M |= Kφ, then it is obviously Res(M,¬Kφ) = {M} which
implies M ′ = M . 
Proposition 6. Consider T and µ ≡ Kφ ∨ K¬φ where φ is objective.
(1) If M ′ = (W ′,w′) is a k-model of T  (Kφ ∨ K¬φ), then there exists a k-model M =
(W,w) of T such that w = w′ and W ′ = W(w,φ), or w = w′ and W ′ = W(w,¬φ);
(2) If M = (W,w) is a k-model of T , then M ′ = (W ′,w′) is a k-model of T  (Kφ ∨
K¬φ), where w′ = w and W ′ = W(w,φ), or w′ = w and W ′ = W(w,¬φ).
Proof. We first prove the following result:
Consider T and µ ≡ Kφ∨K¬φ where φ is objective. Let M = (W,w) be a k-model of
T , and M ′ = (W(w,φ),w) or M ′ = (W(w,¬φ),w). Then for any M ′′ ∈ Mod(Kφ∨K¬φ)
and M ′′ = M ′, M ′ <M M ′′.
This result can be proved in the same way as the proof of the result in the proof of Propo-
sition 4 described earlier.
Now by using this result, we prove statements (1) and (2).
Proof of (1). M ′ = (W ′,w′) is a k-model of T  (Kφ ∨K¬φ) iff M ′ ∈ Mod(T  (Kφ ∨
K¬φ)) iff M ′ ∈ Min(Mod(Kφ ∨ K¬φ),M) for some M ∈ Mod(T ). Now we show that
W ′ = W(w,φ) and w′ = w, or W ′ = W(w,¬φ) and w′ = w. Suppose this is not the case.
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M ′. This contradicts with M ′ ∈ Min(Mod(Kφ ∨ K¬φ),M). Hence our assumption is
wrong and it must be the case W ′ = W(w,φ) or W ′ = W(w,¬φ).
Proof of (2). Let M = (W,w) be a k-model of T . It is easy to see that M ′ = (W(w,φ),w)
or M ′ = (W(w,¬φ),w) is a k-model of Kφ ∨ K¬φ. All we need to show is that M ′ ∈
Min(Mod(Kφ ∨ K¬φ),M). This follows from the above result we proved. 
Proposition 7. Consider T and µ ≡ ¬Kφ ∧ ¬K¬φ where φ is objective.
(1) If M ′ = (W ′,w′) is a k-model of T  µ, then there exists a k-model M = (W,w) of T
such that
(i) if M |= Kφ, then w′ = w and W ′ = W ∪ {w∗}, where w∗ |= ¬φ;
(ii) if M |= K¬φ, then w′ = w and W ′ = W ∪ {w∗}, where w∗ |= φ;
(iii) otherwise, w′ = w and W ′ = W .
(2) If M = (W,w) is a k-model of T , then M ′ = (W ′,w) is a k-model of T  µ where
(i) if M |= Kφ, then W ′ = W ∪ {w∗}, where w∗ |= ¬φ;
(ii) if M |= K¬φ, then W ′ = W ∪ {w∗}, where w∗ |= φ;
(iii) otherwise, W ′ = W .
Proof. We first prove the following result:
Consider T and µ = ¬Kφ ∧ ¬K¬φ. Let M = (W,w) be a k-model of T , and M ′ =
(W ′,w), where W ′ = W ∪ {w∗} and w∗ |= ¬φ if M |= Kφ, W ′ = W ∪ {w∗} and w∗ |=
φ if M |= K¬φ, and W ′ = W otherwise. Then for any k-model M ′′ ∈ Mod(¬Kφ ∧
¬K¬φ) and M ′ = M ′, M ′ <M M ′′.
The proof for this result is similar to the proof of the result in Proposition 5. Let
µ = ¬Kφ ∧ ¬K¬φ. Firstly, it is easy to see that for any M ′′ = (W ′′,w′′) ∈ Mod(¬Kφ ∧
¬K¬φ) where w′′ = w, M ′ <M M ′′. So, to prove the result, we only need to show that for
any k-model M ′′ = (W ′′,w) ∈ Mod(¬Kφ ∧ ¬K¬φ) and W ′′ = W ∪ {w∗}, M ′ <M M ′′.
Let M ′ = (W ∪ {w∗},w), where w∗ |= ¬φ if M |= Kφ and w∗ |= φ if M |= K¬φ. We
first prove that for any k-model M ′′ = (W ′′,w) such that M ′′ |= µ and W ′′ does not have a
form of W ∪ {wi}, M ′ <M M ′′.
Suppose M |= Kφ. Clearly M ′ |= µ.
Case 1. Consider a k-model M ′′ = (W ′′,w) where W ′ = W ∪ {w∗} ⊂ W ′′. Note that
M ′′ |= µ as well. However, from Proposition 1, we have KM′′ ⊂ KM′ ⊆ KM. So M ′ <M
M ′′ according to Definition 2 (i.e., condition (b)).
Case 2. Suppose W ′′ ⊂ W ′. Without loss of generality, we assume that W ′′ = W ∪
{w∗} \ {wj } where wj ∈ W . This follows that W ⊂ W ′′ and W ′′ ⊂ W . So it is the case that
KM \ KM′′ = ∅ and KM′′ \ KM = ∅. On the other hand, we have W ⊆ W ′, from Definition
2 (i.e., condition (a)), we have M ′ <M M ′′.
Case 3. Now suppose W ′′ ⊂ W ′ and W ′ ⊂ W ′. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that W ′′ = W ∪ {w∗,wi} \ {wj }, where wj ∈ W and w∗,wi /∈ W . Again, this
results to the situation that W ⊂ W ′′ and W ′′ ⊂ W . From the above discussion, it implies
M ′ <M M ′′.
C. Baral, Y. Zhang / Artificial Intelligence 164 (2005) 209–243 237Following the same way as above, we can prove that under the condition that M |=
K¬φ and M ′ = (W ∪ {w∗},w) where w∗ |= φ, for any k-model M ′′ = (W ′′,w) such that
M ′′ |= µ and W ′′ does not have a form of W ∪ {wj } M ′ <M M ′′.
Now we show that for any k-model M ′′ that is of the form M ′′ = (W ∪ {wi},w) and
wi is any world such that wi |= ¬φ if M |= Kφ or wi |= φ if M |= K¬φ, M ′ M M ′′ and
M ′′ M M ′. Suppose M ′ M M ′′. Since W ⊂ W ∪ {w∗}, then according to Definition 2,
condition (a) or (b) should be satisfied. As W ⊂ W ∪{wi}, condition (a) can not be satisfied.
So condition (b) must be satisfied. That is, for any ψ such that M |= Kψ and M ′ |= Kψ ,
M ′′ |= Kψ . However, this implies that KM \ KM′ ⊆ KM \ KM′′, and also KM ∩ KM′′ ⊆
KM∩KM′. From Proposition 1 (Results 2 and 4), it follows that W ∪W ′ ⊆ W ∪W ′′, that is,
W ∪{w∗} ⊆ W ∪{wi}. Obviously, this is not true. Similarly, we can show that M ′′ M M ′.
That means, both M ′ and M ′′ are in Res(M,µ). This completes our proof for this result.
By using the above result, we now prove statements (1) and (2).
Proof of (1). M ′ is a k-model of T  µ iff M ′ ∈ Min(Mod(µ),M) for some M ∈
Mod(T ). We show that M ′ must be of the form as stated in statement (1). Similarly to the
proof of Proposition 5 earlier, if M ′ is not of such form, then for a k-model M∗ which has
such form, we have M∗ <M M ′ according to the above result.
Proof of (2). Let M = (W,w) ∈ Mod(T ). All we need to show is that for any M ′ that
is of the form as stated in (2), M ′ ∈ Min(Mod(µ),M). This is indeed the case as showed
by the above result. 
Lemma 1. Let M = (W,w),M1 = (W1,w1) and M2 = (W2,w2) be three k-models.
(1) Deciding whether KM \ KM2 = ∅ and KM2 \ KM = ∅ has time complexity O(|W | ×
|W2|).
(2) Deciding whether KM \ KM1 ⊆ KM \ KM2 has time complexity O(|W1| × (|W | +
|W2|)).
(3) Deciding whether KM1 \KM ⊆ KM2 \KM has time complexityO(|W1|×|W |×|W2|).
Proof. Result (1) is equivalent to deciding whether W ⊂ W2 and W2 ⊂ W (proper set
inclusion). Obviously, this can be verified in O(|W | × |W2|) time.
Now we prove Result (2). From set inclusion and intersection properties, it is easy to
see that KM \ KM1 ⊆ KM \ KM2 iff KM2 ∩ KM ⊆ KM1 ∩ KM. Then from Proposition
1 (Results 2 and 4), it follows that KM2 ∩ KM ⊆ KM1 ∩ KM iff W1 ∪ W ⊆ W2 ∪ W .
Obviously, checking whether W1 ∪ W ⊆ W2 ∪ W can be done in time O(|W1| × (|W | +
|W2|)).
Finally we prove Result (3). First it is easy to show that KM1 \ KM ⊆ KM2 \ KM iff
KM1 ∪ KM ⊆ KM2 ∪ KM iff KM1 ⊆ KM2 ∪ KM. We will now show that
KM1 ⊆ KM2 ∪ KM if and only if there exists w ∈ W and w2 ∈ W2, such that w,w2 /∈
W1.
(⇒) Let φ ∈ KM1 and φ /∈ KM2 ∪KM. This implies φ /∈ KM2 and φ /∈ KM. This implies
there exists w2 ∈ W2 and w ∈ W such that w2 |= φ and w |= φ. These w and w2 are both
not in W1 as φ is true in all worlds of W1.
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holds in all worlds in W1. Hence, KM1 ⊆ KM2 ∪ KM.
Now to determine if there exists w ∈ W and w2 ∈ W2, such that w,w2 /∈ W1, we need to
go through each worlds in W and W2 and check if they are in W1 or not. All these checks
can be done in time O(|W1| × |W | × |W2|). 
To prove Theorem 5, we need to prove the following lemma first.
Lemma A.1. Let X,Y, X̂, Ŷ be sets of propositional atoms and a be a propositional atom,
where |X| = |X̂|, |Y | = |Ŷ | and any two sets of X,Y, X̂, Ŷ and {a} are disjoint. Suppose
φ is an objective formula only using letters from set X ∪ Y . Let T and µ be the following
two S5 formulas respectively:
T = γ1 ∨ γ2, where
γ1 =
((
(X ≡ X̂) ≡ φ)≡ a)∧ (Y ∧ ¬Ŷ ) ∧ ¬K¬(a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧ Y ∧ Ŷ ),
γ2 =
((
(X ∧ ¬X̂) ≡ ¬φ)≡ ¬a)∧ Ŷ , and
µ = K(a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧ Y ∧ Ŷ ) ∨
K
(
¬a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧
(∨
¬Y
)
∧ Ŷ
)
∨
K(¬a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧ Y ∧ Ŷ ).5
Then T  µ is knowledge gradual.
Proof. To prove T  µ to be knowledge gradual, we need to show that for any k-model
M = (W,w) ∈ Mod(T ), if M ′ = (W ′,w′) ∈ Res(M,µ), then either W ⊆ W ′ or W ′ ⊆ W .
From the construction of T , it is easy to see that if M ∈ Mod(T ), then either M |= γ1 or
M |= γ2, but M |= γ1 ∧ γ2. Based on this observation, our proof consists of two cases.
Case 1. Let M = (W,w) ∈ Mod(γ1). Since M |= γ1, we have
w = X1 ∪ X̂1 ∪ Y ∪ {a}, where X1 ∪ Y |= φ for some X1 ⊆ X.
Furthermore, since M |= ¬K¬(a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧ Y ∧ Ŷ ), there exists a world w∗ ∈ W such
that
w∗ = X ∪ Y ∪ Ŷ ∪ {a}.
Now we specify a k-model of µ as follows:
M∗ = ({w∗},w∗).
It is easy to see that M∗ |= K(a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧ Y ∧ Ŷ ). So M∗ |= µ. Furthermore, M∗ is
the unique k-model of K(a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧ Y ∧ Ŷ ). We prove M∗ is the unique k-model in
Res(M,µ).
4 Note that we use notion
∧
w to denote the conjunction of all propositional atoms that occur in w. If an atom
is not in w, its negation will be in
∧
w. For instance, if w = {a, c}, then ∧w = a ∧ ¬b ∧ c when a, b and c are
the only propositional atoms in the language.
5 Recall that
∨¬Y =∨y ∈Y ¬yi .i
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M1 = (W1,w1), where w1 = X ∪ Y1 ∪ Ŷ , where Y1 ⊂ Y (Y1 = Y), and
M2 = (W2,w2), where w2 = X ∪ Y ∪ Ŷ .
Note that
M1 |= K
(
¬a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧
(∨
¬Y
)
∧ Ŷ
)
, and
M2 |= K(¬a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧ Y ∧ Ŷ ).
Consider
Diff (w,w1) = (X \ X1) ∪ X̂1 ∪ (Y \ Y1) ∪ Ŷ ∪ {a},
Diff (w,w2) = (X \ X1) ∪ X̂1 ∪ Ŷ ∪ {a}.
Clearly, we have
Diff (w,w∗) ⊂ Diff (w,w1), and
Diff (w,w∗) ⊂ Diff (w,w1).
So Res(M,µ) = {M∗}. Also observe that M∗ = ({w∗},w∗), {w∗} ⊂ W .
Case 2. Let M = (W,w) ∈ Mod(γ2). We have
w = X ∪ Y1 ∪ Ŷ , where X ∪ Y1 |= ¬φ for some Y1 ⊆ Y.
If Y1 = Y , then we have
w |=
(
¬a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧
(∨
¬Y
)
∧ Ŷ
)
,
this implies that there exists a subset W1 of W where for each wi ∈ W1,
wi |=
(
¬a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧
(∨
¬Y
)
∧ Ŷ
)
.
By specifying W1 to be the maximal such subset of W , it is easy to note that M1 = (W1,w)
is a k-model in Res(M,µ).
On the other hand, if Y1 = Y , then we have
w |= (¬a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧ Y ∧ Ŷ ),
this implies that there exists a subset W2 of W where for each wi ∈ W2,
wi |= (¬a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧ Y ∧ Ŷ ).
Similarly, by specifying W2 to be the maximal such subset of W , it is easy to note that
M2 = (W2,w) is a k-model in Res(M,µ).
Since in both cases, we have W1 ⊆ W and W2 ⊆ W , this follows that for any k-model
M of T where M |= γ2, every resulting k-model after updating M with µ only increases
the knowledge from M . 
Theorem 5. Model checking for knowledge update is P2 -complete. The hardness holds
even if the update is knowledge gradual.
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on a variation of the proof of Lemma A.1. We prove the hardness by giving a polynomial
transformation from deciding the validity of ∃X∀YE, where E is a Boolean expression
using propositional atoms over X∪Y . We construct T , µ and a k-model M∗ over proposi-
tional atoms X∪Y ∪ X̂∪ Ŷ ∪{a}, where |X̂| = |X| and |Ŷ | = |Y |, and any two sets among
X,Y, X̂, Ŷ and {a} are disjoint.
T = γ1 ∨ γ2, where
γ1 =
((
(X ≡ X̂) ≡ E)≡ a)∧ (Y ∧ ¬Ŷ ) ∧ ¬K¬(a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧ Y ∧ Ŷ ),
γ2 =
((
(X ∧ ¬X̂) ≡ ¬E)≡ ¬a)∧ Ŷ ,
µ = K(a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧ Y ∧ Ŷ ) ∨
K
(
¬a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧
(∨
¬Y
)
∧ Ŷ
)
∨
K(¬a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧ Y ∧ Ŷ ),
M∗ = (W ∗,w∗), where
W ∗ = {w∗}, w∗ = X ∪ Y ∪ Ŷ ∪ {a}.
Note that
M∗ |= K(a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧ Y ∧ Ŷ ).
So M∗ is a k-model of µ. Furthermore, it is the unique k-model of K(a∧X∧¬X̂∧Y ∧ Ŷ ).
From Lemma 10, we know that T  µ is knowledge gradual. Now we will show that M∗
is a k-model of T  µ if and only if ∃X∀YE is valid.
(⇒) Suppose ∃X∀YE is valid. Then for some X1 ⊆ X, X1 ∪ Y |= E. We specify a
k-model of γ1 as follows:
M = (W,w), where w = X1 ∪ X̂1 ∪ Y ∪ {a}.
Since M |= ¬K¬(a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧ Y ∧ Ŷ ), it is clear that the world w∗ must be in W , i.e.,
w∗ ∈ W . With the same justification as described in the proof of Lemma A.1, we conclude
that M∗ is a k-model of updating M with µ.
(⇐) Suppose ∃X∀YE is not valid. That is, ∀X∃Y¬E is valid. Then X ∪ Y1 |= ¬E for
some Y1 ⊆ Y . In this case, T has the following type of k-models:
M = (W,w), where w = X ∪ Y1 ∪ Ŷ .
Note that w |= ((X ∧ ¬X̂ ≡ ¬E ≡ ¬a)∧ Ŷ ). That is, M is a k-model of γ2.
If Y1 = Y , then we have
w |=
(
¬a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧
(∨
¬Y
)
∧ Ŷ
)
.
We now specify a k-model of µ as follows: M1 = (W1,w1), where w1 = w and W1 is the
maximal subset of W such that for each wi ∈ W1,
wi |=
(
¬a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧
(∨
¬Y
)
∧ Ŷ
)
.
Since
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Diff (w,w1) = ∅ ⊂ Diff (w,w∗),
M∗ is not a k-model in Res(M,µ).
If Y1 = Y , then we have
w |= (¬a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧ Y ∧ Ŷ ).
Again, we can specify a k-model of µ as follows: M2 = (W2,w2), where w2 = w and W2
is maximal subset of W such that for each wi ∈ W2,
wi |= (¬a ∧ X ∧ ¬X̂ ∧ Y ∧ Ŷ ).
Since Diff (w,w2) = ∅ ⊂ Diff (w,w∗), M∗ is not a k-model in Res(M,µ) in this case
either.
Finally, suppose for some X1 ⊆ X and Y1 ⊆ Y , E is evaluated to be true on X1 ∪Y1, i.e.,
X1 ∪Y1 |= E. Without loss of generality, we can assume Y1 = Y .6 This implies that γ1 does
not have a k-model under this situation. Therefore, if ∃X∀YE is not valid, all k-models of
T must be k-models of γ2. 
Theorem 8. Model checking for knowledge increased update is NP-complete.
Proof. Membership proof. Given T , µ and M ′ = (W ′,w′). To deciding whether M ′ ∈
Mod(T µ), we only need to show that for some M ∈ Mod(T ), M ′ ∈ Res(M,µ). A guess
of M = (W,w) and verifying M |= T can be done in polynomial time. Since T  µ is
knowledge increased, to decide M ′ ∈ Res(M,µ), we only need to check: (1) w = w′,
and (2) for any w∗ ∈ W , w∗ ∈ W ′ iff w∗ |= φµ or w∗ |= ¬φµ for some φµ ∈ Subo(µ).
Obviously, both (1) and (2) can be checked in polynomial time. So the problem is in NP.
Hardness proof. The hardness is proved by transforming the NP-complete SAT problem
to a gaining knowledge update that has been showed to be knowledge increased. Let E be
a CNF on the set of propositional atoms X. We construct formulas T , µ and a k-model M ′
over two disjoint sets X and X̂ where |X| = |X̂|.
T = (X ≡ X̂) ∧ ¬K(X ≡ X̂),
µ ≡ K(X ≡ X̂ ∨ ¬E), and
M ′ = (W ′,w′), where
W ′ = {w′}, w′ = X ∪ X̂.
Clearly, M |= µ. We will show that E is satisfiable iff M ′ ∈ Mod(T  µ). Note that since
T |= X ≡ X̂ ∨¬E and µ = K(X ≡ X̂ ∨¬E), T µ is a gaining knowledge update that is
knowledge increased according to Theorem 5.
(⇒) Suppose E is satisfiable. Let X1 ⊆ X such that X1 |= E. We specify a k-model as
follows:
6 Note that this assumption is always feasible. For instance, if X1 ∪ Y |= E, we can expand Y to be Y ′ by
adding a new atom y′ into Y to make Y = Y ′, i.e., Y ′ = Y ∪ {y′}, and modify E to be E′ = E ∧ ¬y′ such that
X1 ∪ Y |= E′ but X1 ∪ Y ′ |= E′ .
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W ∗ = {w∗,w′′},
w∗ = w′ = X ∪ X̂, and
w′′ = X1 ∪ X̂1, where X̂1 = {xˆi | xˆi ∈ X̂ and xi /∈ X1}.
Since w′′ |= X ≡ X̂, it is easy to see that M∗ |= ¬K(X ≡ X̂). Therefore, M∗ is a k-model
of T . On the other hand, since w′′ |= E and w′′ |= X ≡ X̂, it follows that W ′ = {w′} =
{w∗} = W ∗(w∗,φ), where φ = (X ≡ X̂) ∨ ¬E. From Lemma 6, M ′ ∈ Res(M∗,µ), so M ′ ∈
Mod(T  µ).
(⇐) Now suppose E is not satisfiable. That is, for any X1 ⊆ X, X1 |= ¬E. Then from
Lemma 6, for any k-model of T of the form M = (W,w), where w = w′, M ′ /∈ Res(M,µ).
We consider k-models of T of the form M = (W,w) where w = w′ (note w′ ∈ W ). With-
out loss of generality, we assume that there is one world w∗ ∈ W such that w∗ |= X ≡ X̂,
otherwise M |= K(X ≡ X̂) and M cannot be a k-model of T . On the other hand, since
E is not satisfiable, ¬E must be true in each world in W . So M |= K¬E and hence
M |= K(X ≡ X̂ ∨ ¬E). This implies that W ′ = W(w,φ), where φ = (X ≡ X̂) ∨ ¬E. So
M ′ is not a k-model of T  µ. 
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